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Abstract – Data transmission in a mobile ad hoc network is 
performed within an untrusted wireless environment. It is 
subjected to many kinds of security attacks. In a wormhole attack, 
two malicious nodes work together to tunnel packets from one to 
the other, making other nodes perceive a path to have a smaller 
hop count. We identify two types of wormhole attacks. In the first 
type, malicious nodes do not expose themselves in route finding 
process and legitimate nodes do not know their existence. In the 
second type, malicious nodes do create route advertisements and 
legitimate nodes are aware of the existence of malicious nodes, 
just do not know they are malicious. Existing solutions usually 
can identify only one kind of attacks. In this paper, we propose a 
simple and efficient detection method called DelPHIX. By 
observing the delays of different paths to the receiver, the sender 
is able to detect both kinds of wormhole attacks. This method 
requires neither synchronized clocks nor special hardware to be 
equipped in mobile nodes. The performance of DelPHIX is 
justified by simulations. 
 




A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is formed by a group 
of mobile wireless devices, such as mobile laptop computers, 
PDAs, and wireless phones, that cooperatively communicate 
with each other without a fixed network infrastructure [1]. It 
generally uses a wireless radio communication channel. The 
advantages of MANET are rapid deployment and low cost of 
operation. MANET is especially attractive for scenarios where 
it is infeasible or expensive to deploy significant networking 
infrastructure. Most previous research has focused on the 
realization and practical implementation of MANET, in terms 
of data aggregation protocols and routing protocols, with the 
assumption that MANET works in a trusted environment. 
However, MANET utilizes an untrusted environment for 
data transmission, and therefore it is subjected to various kinds 
of security attacks [2, 3]. For example, the blackhole attack 
refers to an attacker dropping all the traffic passing through it, 
while white hole attack refers to an attacker flooding the  
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network with a large amount of traffic. An attacker can also 
easily eavesdrop on communication, record packets, and 
replay the packets in wireless networks. Most of these attacks 
have been extensively investigated, and the proposed solutions, 
such as the watchdog and the pathrater [4], provide 
encouraging results [2-7]. 
All the attacks mentioned above have a common feature – 
they are preformed by a single attacker. In this paper, we focus 
on a different attack that is launched by a pair of collaborating 
attackers: wormhole attack [8-10]. In a wormhole attack, an 
attacker records packets (or bits from a packet) at one location 
in the network, tunnels them to a second attacker in another 
location, and the second attacker replays the packets there. 
Since the contents of the packets are not modified, wormholes 
cannot be detected by cryptographic techniques. However, as 
these two malicious nodes are acting as neighbors to other 
nodes, and hiding the fact they are in fact several hops away 
by tunneling, this attack imposes severe threats to ad hoc 
network routing protocols. For example, in the Ad hoc On 
Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing mechanism [17], 
the path with smallest hop count is selected. Since the 
malicious nodes are acting as neighbors, the AODV routing 
protocol would get wrong hop count information and select an 
inappropriate path. Malicious nodes can also lure other nodes 
to send traffic through them by advertising apparently short 
paths so as to launch other attacks to the data packets. 
We identify two types of wormhole attacks: Hidden Attack 
and Exposed Attack. In a hidden attack, malicious nodes do 
not take part in finding routes, that is, legitimate nodes do not 
know their existence. On the other hand, in an exposed attack, 
malicious nodes do create route advertisements and legitimate 
nodes are aware of the existence of malicious nodes, just do 
not know they are malicious. In the literature, most of the 
proposed protocols, with additional hardware or synchronized 
clocks, can only identify the hidden attack, but not the exposed 
attack. 
In this paper, we present an efficient method in detecting 
both kinds of wormhole attacks – DelPHIX, an extension to 
our earlier work Delay Per Hop Indication (DelPHI) 
Wormhole Detection [16]. DelPHIX allows the sender to 
check whether there are any malicious nodes sitting along its 
paths to the receiver that are trying to launch wormhole attacks. 
We obtain the delay and the hop count information of some 
disjoint paths between the sender and the receiver, and collect 
the average round trip delay of immediate neighbors, then use 
this information to indicate whether a certain path among 
these disjoint paths is subjected to wormhole attacks. The 
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advantages of DelPHIX are that it neither requires clock 
synchronization nor position information. Moreover, it does 
not require the mobile nodes to be equipped with some special 
hardware, which in turns provides higher power efficiency. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We 
first present and compare two kinds of wormhole attacks in the 
next section. Then some related works are presented in Section 
III. In Section IV, we present our DelPHIX detection 
mechanism. The performance of DelPHIX is evaluated by 
simulations in Section V. In Section VI, we address the 
message overhead issue and finally, we conclude the paper 
with the future work direction in Section VII. 
 
II. TWO KINDS OF WORMHOLE ATTACKS 
 
In a wormhole attack, two attackers work together. One 
receives the packets, tunnels the packets to its partner, and 
then the partner replays them into the network. In a hidden 
attack, malicious nodes hide the fact that they forward a 
packet and legitimate nodes do not know their participation in 
packet forwarding. In an exposed attack, legitimate nodes are 
aware of the fact that the malicious nodes are forwarding 
packets, just do not know they are malicious. 
 
 
(a) Hidden Attack 
 
(b) Exposed Attack 
Fig. 1. Two types of wormhole attacks 
 
Hidden Attack – The attackers do not modify the content of 
the packet and the packet header, even the packet is an AODV 
advertisement packet. Instead, they simply tunnel the packet 
from one point and replay it at another point. This kind of 
wormhole attacks makes the sender treat the receiver as its 
immediate neighbor. Suppose that S wants to establish a route 
to R using AODV. S would broadcast a RREQ (route request) 
message. Any node that receives the RREQ should check 
whether it knows how to get to R. If not, it should continue to 
broadcast RREQ if it receives RREQ for the first time. The 
intermediate nodes should also update the hop count 
information and put its identity in the packet header. However, 
in the hidden attack, malicious nodes do not update the packet 
header as it should. As shown in Fig. 1(a), when S initiates a 
route setup procedure, it broadcast a RREQ packet to the 
network, with previous_ node_id = S and hop_count = 1 in the 
header. When M1 receives the RREQ, it tunnels the packets to 
M2 and M2 replays them to R, without modifying the packet 
header. Since M1 and M2 do not include themselves in the 
header, R will think the received RREQ was sent from S that 
is 1 hop away. Then, R mistakenly treats S as its immediate 
neighbor. The same observation can be obtained in the reverse 
path, such that S finds R as its immediate neighbor, and the 
path found is {S, R}. This is obviously not correct since S and 
R are separated by M1, M2, and other nodes that are in the 
tunnel. 
Exposed Attack – In this kind of attacks, the attackers also 
do not modify the content of the packet, but they expose 
themselves in the route finding process. Other nodes are aware 
that the malicious nodes lie on the path but they would think 
that the malicious nodes are direct neighbors. Let’s consider 
the situation where S wants to establish a route to R. As 
illustrated in Fig. 1(b), when S initiates a route setup 
procedure, it broadcasts a RREQ packet to the network, with 
previous_node_id = S and hop_count = 1 in the header. When 
M1 receives the packet, it modifies the previous_node_id field 
to M1 and increases the hop_count by 1, just like the normal 
AODV operations. Then the RREQ packet is tunneled to M2 
and M2 performs the same route setup procedure and 
broadcasts the RREQ packet to R. R finds that it is 3 hops 
away from S through neighbor M2. The same thing happens in 
the reverse path. When S receives the RREP packet, it finds 
that through M1, there are 3 hops to R. And the route is 
formed as {S, M1, M2, R}. 
In both kinds of attacks, there is at least one pair of 
“neighbors” that are actually not direct neighbors. In Fig. 1(a), 
S and R perceive themselves as neighbors but they are not. We 
call this kind of neighbors “false neighbors.” In Fig. 1(b), M1 
and M2 are false neighbors. Please note that a hidden attack 
can usually generate more false neighbor pairs than an 
exposed attack. It is because any node in the neighborhood of 
M1 can be a false neighbor of any node in the neighborhood of 
M2 in a hidden attack. On the other hand, there is only a pair 
of false neighbor, M1 and M2, in an exposed attack. Since 
neighbors should be within transmission range with each other, 
if we are able to know the distance between neighbors and 
find that the distance between two neighbors are out of range, 
we can tell whether a wormhole attack occurs. 
 
III. RELATED WORKS 
 
Some mechanisms have been developed to detect 
wormhole attacks. Hu et al. proposed in [8] to put information 
in a packet to restrict the transmission distance of the packet 
so as to avoid tunneling. The authors called the information 
packet leash and they proposed two types of packet leashes: 
geographical leash and temporal leash. In the geographical 
leash, the location information and loosely synchronized 
clocks together verify the neighbor relation. In the temporal 
leash, the packet transmission distance is calculated as the 
product of signal propagation time and the speed of light. The 
main idea behind packet leashes is to limit the single hop 
transmission distance. However, this approach can only 
identify the hidden attack but not the exposed attack. As 
shown in Fig. 1(a), S and R treat themselves as neighbors, but 
in reality, they are a few hops away, and thus wormhole can be 
detected by packet leashes. However, it is not the case in the 
exposed attack in Fig. 1(b). S knows M1 is its neighbor, and R 
knows M2 is its neighbor. Both the transmission distances of 
{S, M1} and {M2, R} are found to be within one hop. 
Definitely, M1 and M2 will not tell others that they are in fact 
out of range. Hence the wormhole is not detected. 
The mechanism developed in [11], called SECTOR, 
assumes each node is equipped with a special hardware that 
can respond to a one-bit challenge without any delay. The 
challenger measures the round-trip-time (RTT) of the signal 
with an accurate clock to calculate the distance between the 
neighboring nodes. The probability that an attacker can guess 
S 
Tunnel 
1 S 3 M2 
M1 M2 R 
2 M1 3 M2
S 
Tunnel 
1 S 1 S 1 S 1 S
M1 M2 R 
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all bits correctly decreases exponentially as the number of 
challenges increases. Instead of limiting the packet 
transmission distance of a single hop, the idea of SECTOR is 
to use accurate RTT for calculating the distance with a certain 
neighbor, and compare the distance with the transmission 
range. Thus it also cannot provide solution to the exposed 
wormhole attack problem. 
In [12], similar to SECTOR, per-hop RTT is used for the 
detection of a wormhole attack. Whenever a node receives a 
route request message, before forwarding, it will send a 
verification message to the pervious node and wait for the 
reply. The request is forwarded only if the RTT is approved. 
With similar reason, this method can only solve the hidden 
attack but not the exposed attack. Moreover, this method adds 
extra delay in the route setup procedure. 
Another method called NVP is proposed in [13] for 
replay-based attacks. NVP considers both RTT-based approach 
and power-based approach for calculating the transmission 
range. By combining the two approaches, the authors claim 
that the transmitting power to receiving power ratio is a 
function of round trip propagation delay. If the transmission is 
passing through an intruder, then the power values are altered. 
Intruder cannot find a suitable transmission power to suit the 
function, as it does not know the required receiving power 
strength and the distance between the sender and the receiver. 
NVP works well in hidden attack as it is able to find false 
neighbors in the network. However, in an exposed attack, the 
malicious nodes would not tell others the fact that they are 
false neighbors. Thus NVP fails in the detection. 
SAM [14, 15] is a detection mechanism with the ability to 
detect exposed attacks. However, it fails in detecting hidden 
attacks. SAM employs a multi-path routing mechanism that 
multiple non-disjoint paths between sender and receiver are 
found. The main idea is that the tunneled link between the two 
attackers will be selected with higher probability than other 
links due to the smaller hop count than other routes. The 
receiver gathers the multi-path information from the route 
request messages and calculates the frequency of the selected 
links. The frequency of tunneled link should be much higher 
than that of normal links. However, this mechanism may fail 
to detect hidden attacks since there may be many false 
neighbors, making the detection inaccurate. No simulation 
results about detection rate were reported in the papers. 
There are also some other methods proposed to defense 
against wormhole attacks. In [6], distributed Network 
Monitors were developed to monitor the control messages of 
the AODV routing protocol, and observe whether the behavior 
violates the “correct behavior” captured by the specifications. 
This “correct behavior” is pre-defined in the monitors and is 
manually configured. Although Network Monitors can handle 
both the hidden and exposed attacks, there are still some 
drawbacks with this mechanism. The monitors must be placed 
carefully to cover the whole network. In addition, these 
monitors require manual configuration. This is not suitable for 
dynamic networks. It also suffers from the single point of 
failure problem. 
[10] studies how to enhance the security of routing 
protocol in ad hoc networks. The defense mechanism simply 
uses the fastest path, instead of using the path with smallest 
hop count. It can prevent wormhole attack with actual path 
length longer than the false hop count produced by the 
malicious pair. However, it is not a detection mechanism and 
cannot tell whether there is a wormhole attack in the network 
or not. 
The mechanisms [6, 8, 11-13] either use special hardware, 
location information and/or synchronized clocks, increasing 
the cost, complexity and power consumption of the wireless 
nodes. Still, [8, 11-13] cannot provide solution in detecting the 
exposed wormhole attacks. Although [6] provides solutions to 
both kinds of wormhole attacks, it is not suitable for dynamic 
networks. 
Our approach DelPHIX is different from [6, 8, 11-13] in 
the way that it does not require synchronized clocks, 
positioning device and special hardware. In other words, 
DelPHIX is a simpler approach, with lower cost and power 
consumption. More importantly, DelPHIX is able to detect 
both the hidden and exposed wormhole attacks. 
DelPHIX is similar to SAM [14, 15] as it also gets rid of 
using synchronized clocks, positioning device and special 
hardware. However, there are many differences. First, 
although both DelPHIX and SAM collect information of 
multiple paths between sender and receiver, DelPHIX only 
requires disjoint path information while SAM requires 
non-disjoint paths as well. Moreover, SAM requires the 
hop-by-hop information of whole path is known but DelPHIX 
does not. In other words, the overhead in collecting path 
information of DelPHIX is smaller. On the other hand, SAM is 
executed by the receiver, while DelPHIX is executed by the 
sender. Therefore, DelPHIX is less vulnerable to denial-of- 
service attacks. Another main difference is that, SAM counts 
“links” from the multi-path information, and uses the 
frequency of the appeared link as the detection criterion. This 
is a fatal weakness in detecting hidden wormhole attack, as the 
“tunneled link” is hidden by the malicious nodes, and the 
“high frequency” is spread out by their neighbors. Instead, 
DelPHIX utilizes the whole path information for detection, 
and therefore it can detect both kinds of wormhole attacks.  
We developed a wormhole detection mechanism called 
DelPHI earlier [16]. However, DelPHI works only when there 
is at least one normal path and under some network traffic 
assumptions. We fix some of the problems of DelPHI in 
DelPHIX and detailed detection mechanism of DelPHIX will 
be described in the next section. In the rest of our discussion, 
we refer a path that is under wormhole attack as a “wormhole 
path”. 
 
IV. DelPHIX DETECTION MECHANISM 
 
In our DelPHIX wormhole detection, we collect both hop 
count and delay information of disjoint paths and calculate the 
delay/hop value to serve as the indicator of detecting 
wormhole attacks, which provides a general solution for both 
kinds of wormhole attacks. The reason behind is that under 
normal situation, the delay a packet experiences in 
propagating one hop should be similar along each hop along 
the path. Hence the delay/hop values should also be similar for 
all the normal paths. However, under a wormhole attack, the 
delay for propagating across false neighbors should be 
unreasonably high since there are in fact many hops between 
them. It also leads to an increase in the delay/hop value of the 
path. Therefore, if we compare the delay/hop value of a 
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legitimate path with the delay/hop value of a wormhole path, 
we should find that the delay/hop value of the legitimate path 
is smaller. In addition, if a path has a distinguishable high 
delay/hop value, it is likely to be subjected to a wormhole 
attack. 
However, a congested legitimate path may have a high 
delay/hop value. In order to further reduce false detection that 
mistakenly treats a congested normal path as a wormhole path, 
we also use the average round trip time between the sender 
and its neighbors as a reference. It is expected that the 
delay/hop value of a legitimate path is also similar to the time 
needed to traverse from the sender to its neighbors. Therefore, 
if the delay/hop of a path is larger than the average round trip 
delay of immediate neighbors (multiplied by some factors), it 
is very possible that the path is under a wormhole attack. 
To avoid the need of synchronized clocks, positioning 
device and other special hardware, DelPHIX collects 
information and performs detection at the sender. DelPHIX 
obtains delay and hop count information in a way similar to 
the AODV route setup mechanism [17]. When the detection is 
initiated, the sender broadcasts a request message to the 
receiver. Every intermediate node re-broadcasts the request 
message if it is the first time to the message; otherwise, simply 
drops it.  In AODV, intermediate node replies the request 
message if it has a valid route to the receiver in its routing 
table.  DelPHIX is different and requires all intermediate 
nodes to broadcast the request message without checking the 
routing table. Another different from AODV is that DelPHIX 
allows the receiver to reply all the request messages received, 
while receiver using AODV only replies to the first received 
request message. In this way, a DelPHIX sender can obtain the 
information of some disjoint paths to the receiver. By 
comparing the delay/hop values among these disjoint paths, 
paths under wormhole attack can be identified. 
DelPHIX has two phases. In the first phase, delay and hop 
count information is collected. In the second phase, the sender 
analyzes the information obtained in the first phase for 
detecting whether there is any wormhole attack. 
 
A. First Phase: Data Collection 
 
In this phase, the sender initiates the detection and collects 
information. Two kinds of messages are introduced: DelPHIX 
Request (DREQ) and DelPHIX Reply (DREP). Similar to the 
AODV RREQ and RREP packets, DREQ is used for the 
sender to find disjoint paths to the receiver, while DREP is 
sent from the receiver back to the sender to identify paths. 
Both DREQ and DREP packets include a pervious_node_id 
field, a hop_count field, and a timestamp field. We use 
pervious_node_id but not the whole path information simply 
because of saving the network resources. If the path is long, 
then the packet with whole path information will be large. 
When the sender initiates DelPHIX wormhole detection, it 
broadcasts a DREQ packet to the receiver, which is illustrated 
in Fig. 2(a). The previous_node_id field is filled with the 
sender’s node ID, the hop_count field is set to 1, and the 
timestamp field is set with the time when the packet is sent. 
The previous_node_id field and the hop_count field will be 
modified by intermediate nodes while the timestamp field is 
never changed by other nodes, even the receiver. Therefore, 
the sender should protect the integrity of the timestamp using 
some standard security mechanisms. 
 
(a) DREQ roadmap 
 
(b) DREP roadmap 
Fig. 2. Two possible disjoint paths 
 
When an intermediate node receives a DREQ packet, it 
records the previous_node_id field and establishes a reverse 
path to the sender. Then it puts its node ID into the 
pervious_node_id field and increases the hop_count field by 1. 
The resulted DREQ packet is then broadcasted. 
The forwarding of DREQ is somewhat similar to the 
AODV RREQ forwarding. Any node in the network 
broadcasts DREQ received and sets up a reverse path when it 
receives the packet in the first time. When the same packet is 
received at the second time, it can be simply dropped. Unlike 
the AODV route setup, a node must forward the DREQ no 
matter there is a record in its routing table or not, until the 
packet reaches the receiver. To secure this procedure, the 
sender and receiver can sign the packet such that no 
intermediate node can impersonate the receiver to reply a 
DREQ message. 
When the receiver gets a DREQ, it unicasts a DREP packet 
to the sender through the reverse path, and is illustrated in Fig. 
2(b). It puts its node ID in the pervious_node_id field, sets the 
hop_count field to 1, and copies the timestamp field of the 
DREQ packet to the DREP packet. Similar to the request 
procedure, an intermediate node puts its node ID into the 
pervious_node_id field and increases the hop_count field by 1 
upon receiving the DREP packet. Every intermediate node 
only forwards the DREP packet once for each corresponding 
DREQ. 
Noted that the receiver replies to every DREQ packet 
received (compare with AODV, receiver only replies to the 
first RREQ received), and each node only broadcasts the 
DREQ packet once. Hence the sender can receive a number of 
DREP packets where each of them follows a path that is 
disjoint from the paths of other DREP packets. In other words, 
the DREP packets collect information of a set of disjoint paths 
from the sender to the receiver. It should be noted that the 
number of disjoint paths is bounded by the number of 
neighbors of the sender. As shown in Fig. 2(b), S can receive 2 
DREP packets, one from M1 (for path {S, M1, M2, R}) and 
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Each DREP carries the hop count information of the path 
that it is associated with. It also carries the timestamp 
indicating the time that the sender sent the corresponding 
DREQ. Therefore, the round trip time of the path is the time 
difference between the time at which the sender receives 
DREP and the timestamp carried in the DREP. Then, the 
sender is able to calculate the delay/hop value of the 
corresponding path.  
Since MANET works in an unreliable wireless 
environment, DREQ and DREP packets could be lost. To 
enhance reliability of the information collected, the data 
collection procedure is repeated several (num_repeats) times.  
It is possible that the hop counts of the DREPs received from 
the same neighbor are different. In this case, we select the 
delay/hop of the shortest path for analysis. It is because a path 
that is under wormhole attack tends to be shorter. Among all 
the shortest path DREPs, we take the average of the delays for 
wormhole detection. For example, again refer to Fig. 2, during 
the second broadcast, E receives a DREQ from C prior than D, 
then the path formed becomes {S, A, B, C, E, R}, and S 
receives a DREP from A with hop count set to 5. Knowing that 
there is a path to R through A is 4 hops in length, the 5-hop 
information is ignored. Similarly, if the first broadcast obtains 
the 5-hop information while the 4-hop information is obtained 
in a later broadcast, then the 5-hop record is deleted and 
updated by the 4-hop data. If there are several trials of 4-hop 
and 5-hop, we take the average of the 4-hop trials for phase 2. 
To distinguish the DREQs of the num_repeats different 
trials, we have to put some identifiers in the packet headers. 
As there are many standard mechanisms for this purpose and 
is not the focus of this paper, we leave the details to the 
readers and describe the detection in details in the following. 
 
B. Second Phase: Data Analysis and Detection 
 
In this phase, the collected data are analyzed. There are 
two analytical tests for detecting a wormhole: First, we 
identify normal paths, and put the remaining uncertain paths 
into a suspected set. Then, the suspected set is further tested 
for detecting a wormhole attack. 
Suppose the sender initiates the detection, i.e. broadcasts 
the DREQ packet, at time ts, and receives a DREP packet from 
a neighbor node i at time ti, then the round trip time (RTT) of 
the path through node i is given by 
RTTi = ti – ts. 
If the hop_count field in the DREP from node i is hi, then 
the delay per hop (DPH) value of the path to the receiver 








−= =  (1) 
In normal situation, a smaller h provides a smaller value of 
RTT. It can be explained by the fact that a shorter path should 
have a smaller round trip time. Hence the DPH of normal 
paths should have similar values independent to h. However, it 
is not the case in the wormhole paths. Recall that a tunnel is 
formed by two malicious nodes. No matter how long the 
tunnel is, the malicious pair M1 and M2 advertise to others 
that they are 1 hop away. Therefore, the longer the tunnel, the 
larger the RTT, but the hop_count remains small. The resulted 
DPH value of a wormhole path will be larger than that of a 
normal path. 
To prove its correctness, suppose there is a normal path 
found through node A, while a wormhole path is found 













We performed some simulations, based on the topology in 
Fig. 4 presented in the next section, in order to get the insight 
of the relationship between the DPH values and the hop_count. 
The relationship is shown in Fig. 6, in which the “path length” 
indicates the actual hop_count of the path including the nodes 
within the tunnel. We observed that the DPH values of normal 
paths usually appear as smaller values when compared with 
those of wormhole paths. The DPH values of normal and 
wormhole paths in the same network setting form two separate 
groups as shown in Fig. 3. The difference between “the 
smallest DPH in the wormhole group” and “the largest DPH 
in the normal group” is always larger than the difference 
between any 2 DPH values within the same group. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Relationship of normal and wormhole paths 
 
Based on this observation, we first arrange the DPH values 
in ascending order in the first test. Then, we find whether there 
is a large difference between 2 adjacent values. If DPHi is less 
than the next DPH value by a Threshold (T1), or 
DPHj – DPHi > T1, 
then all paths with DPH values larger than DPHi are put in the 
suspected set for another testing, while the remaining paths 
with smaller DPH are treated as normal paths. 
It is worth noting that we put the paths with large DPH 
into a suspected set instead of immediately treat them as 
wormhole paths. The reason is that some paths may have 
larger delay than the others due to congestion, interference, etc. 
If we simply treated all paths in the suspected set as wormhole 
paths, DelPHIX would falsely identify some legitimate paths 
as wormhole paths. 
If we cannot separate the paths into two groups, we also 
put all the paths in the suspected set. It is because there are 
three cases that we are unable to locate the large difference (> 
T1) between the two groups: 
y All are normal paths – In this case, the DPH values are 
of similar small values and within the normal group. 
y All are wormhole paths – In this case, the DPH values 
are of similar large values and within the wormhole 
group. 
y Congested normal paths – In this case, suppose 
DPH 
Normal Wormhole 
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congestion is outside the tunneled link, the DPH values 
of the congested normal paths are as large as that of 
wormhole paths, all DPHs are within the wormhole 
group. 
To identify the wormhole paths in the above cases, we rely 
on the second test. In the second test, we use the average RTT 
of all the immediate neighbors (NRTT), times a weighting 
factor, as a threshold (T2). Immediate neighbors are nodes 
within transmission range. NRTT can be obtained through the 
AODV hello message [17]. When a node receives a hello 
message, it replies with a short message, e.g. simply its 
node_id, and therefore the overhead is minimal. NRTT can 
reflect the network situation. If the network is congested, 
NRTT is large; otherwise it appears as a small value. We 
observe from extensive simulations that 
2
NRTTDPH≥ . 
When the connection is only one hop, both sides of the 
inequality have more or less the same value. In multi-hop 
transmission, the propagation delays of different paths may 
vary. Some paths may have larger delays than the others due to 
congestion, interference, etc. In other words, DPHs of both 
normal and tunnel paths may be larger than NRTT/2. An 
interesting observation is found with the value 
(NRTT/2)×hop_count. For a wormhole path, with the claimed 
small hop_count, the value remains small, but the DPH is 
increasing with the path length (actual hop count). For a 
normal path, on the other hand, the value is increasing with the 
path length, while the DPH remains small independently. The 
above observation is justified by simulations. The DPH and T2 
relationships of wormhole path and normal path are shown in 
Fig. 6. Therefore, the threshold (T2) is designed as: 
 α××= icounthopNRTTT _22  (2) 
In case of a single hop transmission, or it is a hidden 
wormhole attack (such that hop_count = 1), we need a 
weighting factor α to avoid DPH equals to T2. The weighting 
factor is defined as: 
1.1 if _ 1
1 if _ 1
hop count
hop count
α =⎧= ⎨ >⎩
 
Therefore, if DPHi is larger than T2, the path through node 
i can be concluded, with high certainty, as a wormhole path. 
 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS 
 
 
Fig. 4. Simulation topology 
In this section, the performance of DelPHIX is evaluated 
by simulation using the LBNL network simulator ns [18]. 
Random topologies with N nodes and size L×L are randomly 
generated by a random generator provided by ns. The value of 
num_repeats is set to 3. Sender (S), receiver (R) and malicious 
pair (M1 and M2) are put in the corresponding places as 
shown in Fig. 4, e.g. S is randomly put in square A with size 
100×100 in the lower left hand corner. 
We have performed a number of simulations, and due to 
space limitation, we only present some representative results 
in this paper. The settings of these simulations are as follows: 
(a) L = 1000, N = 50; (b) L = 750, N = 30; and (c) L = 500, N = 
15. Please note that a smaller network has a shorter tunnel. For 
each setting, we generated 1000 different networks with 
random node placement, and we obtained the average among 
all the 1000 topologies. 
We first conducted simulations with different settings 
against different threshold values (T1), the results are shown in 
Tables I – III. Column “Normal path” refers to the percentage 
of normal paths (paths that are not attacked) that are detected 
correctly. Column “Wormhole path” is defined in a similar 
way. As expected, the smaller the threshold (T1), the easier to 
detect wormhole attacks, as fewer paths are treated as normal 
path in the first test. However, it also leads to a higher rate of 
treating a normal path as a wormhole path. 
 
TABLE I 
DETECTION RATE WITH DIFFERENT THRESHOLD (L=500) 
Threshold (T) /ms Normal path /% Wormhole path /% 
5 98.14 50.48 
4 96.55 51.18 
3 93.89 51.75 
2 87.58 52.08 
1 86.92 60.55 
 
TABLE II 
DETECTION RATE WITH DIFFERENT THRESHOLD (L=750) 
Threshold (T) /ms Normal path /% Wormhole path /% 
5 98.16 92.38 
4 97.78 92.66 
3 97.78 93.50 
2 97.70 93.50 
1 97.62 93.22 
 
TABLE III 
DETECTION RATE WITH DIFFERENT THRESHOLD (L=1000) 
Threshold (T) /ms Normal path /% Wormhole path /% 
5 99.66 96.47 
4 99.58 96.47 
3 99.58 96.79 
2 99.58 96.79 
1 99.58 96.79 
 
It is found that the detection rate is higher in a larger 
topology. This can be explained by the fact that smaller L has a 
larger chance that the tunnel is short, the DPH values of 
wormhole paths and normal paths become comparably close, 









S: random in A 
R: random in D 
M1: random in (A+B) 
M2: random in (C+D) 
L 
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turns lower the detection rate (will be explained by further 
simulations later). In order to maintain the detection rate of 
normal paths above 90% and that of wormhole paths should be 
remained as high as possible, we set T1 = 3ms in the following 
simulations, which evaluate the performance of DelPHIX in 
the absence of background traffic, and study the effect of 























Fig. 6. DPH when no background traffic 
 
Fig. 5 shows the simulation results when there is no 
background traffic. We started our simulation with tunnel 
length set to 2 hops. This is simply because 1 hop is not 
regarded as a tunnel. Here, the tunnel length stands for the hop 
count from M1 to M2. For normal path, M1 and M2 simply 
act as legitimate nodes. It is found that the longer the tunnel, 
the higher the detection rate of wormhole attack, and the 
detection rate of normal path is independent to the tunnel 
length. 
To explain this phenomenon, the DPH values are plotted 
against different path length, with the corresponding threshold 
T2, as shown in Fig. 6. The “path length” in the figure 
indicates the actual hop_count of the path from the sender to 
the receiver, including the nodes within the tunnel. It is shown 
that the DPH of wormhole path increases with increasing path 
length, while the DPH of normal path remains in a similar 
level. By equation 1 in Section III(B), when the path is under 
wormhole attack, no matter how long the tunnel is, it always 
treats it as 1 hop, hence h remains small. On the other hand, a 
longer path gives a larger RTT. Therefore, the longer the path 
(as well as the tunnel), the larger the DPH. 
T2 has an opposite behavior. For a normal path, T2 is 
directly proportional to the path length. However, for a 
wormhole path, since the hop_count is small, T2 remains at a 
small value. This behavior of DPH and T2 leads to a high 
detection rate of DelPHIX wormhole detection. Noted that the 
detection rate of wormhole path drops when the path is short 
(2 to 3 hops). This is because in this case, the DPH values of 
normal path and wormhole path are similar, some wormhole 
paths are mistakenly treated as normal paths while passing the 
first test. 
Another set of simulations were conducted with 
background traffic. The background traffic was set in the 
following way: Connections are setup in randomly chosen 
non-overlapping node pairs, i.e. there is only one-to-one 
transmission, no node is a sender of more than 1 receiver and 























Fig. 8. DPH when light background traffic 
 
Fig. 7 presents the detection rate of DelPHIX when there is 
light background traffic. We define light as 20% of nodes are 
having connections, i.e. the number of connections equals to 
10% of the number of nodes. The result shows similar pattern 
when compared as Fig. 5. However, it is found that when there 
is light background traffic, the detection rate is slightly 
decreased. 
According to the DPH and T2 behavior in Fig. 8, when 
there is background traffic, the DPH of normal path is 
increased. For wormhole path, with the claimed small hop 
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wormhole, and makes the tunneled link congested, which in 
turn increases the DPH. On the other hand, the variation (due 
to delay jitter) of the DPH becomes larger in normal path due 
to the background traffic. Since the background traffic is light, 
the difference between the DPH values of wormhole path and 
normal path may not be larger than the variation of the DPH 
of normal path. This makes some wormhole paths become 
























Fig. 10. DPH when heavy background traffic 
 
When there is heavy background traffic, the detection rate 
of both normal path and wormhole path can achieve 100% 
when the tunnel path is long as shown in Fig. 9. We define 
heavy as all nodes are having connections, i.e. the number of 
connections equals to 50% of the number of nodes. Fig. 10 
shows the DPH behavior under heavy background traffic. It is 
found that the DPH of wormhole path is increased 
significantly, while that of normal path remains small when 
compared with wormhole path. 
The reason is that, due to the claimed small hop count 
through the wormhole, the traffic will choose this path as their 
shortest path, which leads to heavy congestion in the tunnel. 
Therefore, the DPH value through the wormhole path is 
dramatically increased. The difference between the DPH of 
wormhole path and that of normal path becomes more obvious 
and larger than the variation (due to delay jitter) of the DPH of 
normal path. Therefore all paths are put in the suspected set 
for the second test. Since the network is congested, NRTT is 
large, and the resulted T2 is also increased for normal path, but 
it remains small for wormhole path, as shown in Fig. 10. This 
makes the second test successful, and leads to a higher 
detection rates than the pervious 2 scenarios. 
 
Finally, we also conducted simulations with uneven 
background traffic by randomly locate the light background 
traffic in the upper-left quarter of the topology.  The detection 
rate is similar to the case of light background traffic but with a 
larger fluctuation.  Due to space limitation, the result is not 




In this section, the overhead of DelPHIX is addressed. The 
notations are defined as follows: 
N : Number of mobile nodes 
P : Number of found disjoint paths 
hi : hop count of path i 
Consider in each request, every node (except the receiver) 
broadcasts a DREQ packet once, there are totally N-1 request 
packets transmitted in the network. The number of DREQ 
packets that the receiver can receive is equal to the number of 
disjoint paths P. In DelPHIX, P is bounded by the number of 
neighbors of the sender and the number of neighbors of the 
receiver. Therefore we have 
P << N. 
Since the receiver replies to all DREQ packets, the number 








Hence the total number of packets transmitted in the 
network for one DelPHIX request can be calculated as the sum 









Note that the detection procedure consists of num_repeats 
requests, therefore the total message overhead for DelPHIX 







num repeats N h
=
⎛ ⎞× − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ . (3) 
AODV is chosen to provide comparison because the route 
setup procedure is similar to DelPHIX. For AODV route setup, 
since the sender only broadcasts the RREQ once, and the 
receiver only replies to one RREP, therefore the message 
overhead is given by 
 N – 1 + h. (4) 
If we set N = 50 and num_repeats = 3, by simulation, we 
find that 
E[P] = 3.06537, 
E[h] = 4.16280. 
Substituting them into equations 3 and 4, we obtain the 
message overhead of DelPHIX wormhole detection is 
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major factor is the num_repeats request procedures in 
providing reliability. In other words, there is a tradeoff 
between providing reliability and minimizing the message 
overhead. To reduce message overhead in highly congested 
situation, DelPHIX sender can launch DREQ for once only. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
In this paper, we have described an efficient algorithm for 
detecting wormhole attack in mobile ad hoc networks. We call 
it DelPHIX. The advantages of DelPHIX are that it does not 
require clock synchronization and position information, and it 
does not require the mobile nodes to be equipped with some 
special hardwares, thus it provides higher power efficiency. 
DelPHIX does not collect single-hop information or 
link-based information, which have been shown to be 
insufficient to detect both hidden wormhole attacks and 
exposed wormhole attacks. To be more specific, DelPHIX 
collects path-based information with DelPHIX Request 
(DREQ) and DelPHIX Reply (DREP) packets in a similar way 
of AODV route setup procedure. And we use the delay per hop 
(DPH) values as an indicator for detecting a wormhole attack. 
The performance of DelPHIX has been evaluated by 
conducting various simulations using the ns simulator. It has 
been shown that DelPHIX can achieve higher than 95% in 
detecting both normal paths and wormhole paths, in the 
absence of background traffic. Simulation results have also 
shown that DelPHIX can maintain above 90% of detection 
rate for both normal and wormhole paths given that there is 
background traffic. 
The message overhead of DelPHIX has also been 
addressed in this paper. We compared it with AODV route 
setup procedures and found that the major factor is the 
num_repeats request procedures in providing reliability. There 
is a tradeoff between providing reliability of DelPHIX and 
minimizing the message overhead, and may need further 
investigation.  In the future, we would also like to work on a 
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